Israel vs. Iran: Analyzing potential conflict scenarios

Conventional deterrence in the Middle East is in crisis. None of the actors is able to control the escalation of the conflict. Three scenarios of how the situation could develop.

The American Navy’s amphibious aircraft carrier “Wasp” with a battalion of Marines on board cruised off the Israeli-Lebanese coast all summer.

Stelios Misinas / Reuters

The landing of the US Marines in Izmir could actually have been a sign of detente. But two Marines were detained and mocked by members of a Turkish nationalist youth group. The bystanders chanted “Yankee, go home”. Almost at the same time, communist activists protested against the American presence with Palestinian flags.

After a week-long deployment off the coast of Israel and Lebanon, the USS “Wasp”, an amphibious aircraft carrier of the American Navy, dropped anchor in the port of Izmir on Sunday. The unfriendly reception testifies to the ambivalent relationship between NATO ally Turkey and the USA. Ankara is neutral in the Ukraine war, but the two powers have pointedly opposing positions in the Middle East conflict.

While Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has portrayed himself – at least outwardly – as the protector of the Palestinians, the USA has tried to support Israel militarily in recent months. To this end, Washington is currently concentrating two carrier strike groups in the Red Sea – two aircraft carriers and several escort ships – as well as the submarine “Georgia” and the “Wasp” in the eastern Mediterranean.

The “Axis of Resistance” as a symmetrical opponent

With this force, the American armed forces could win a comprehensive war in the region. In August, a battalion of Marines was on the “Wasp” ready to intervene on the ground: either to evacuate American citizens or to support the Israeli army (IDF).

Only when the “Wasp” set course for Izmir and thus left the immediate conflict area was the crew's level of readiness reduced again. The expansion of the Middle East war to the entire region was once again prevented.

At the height of tension at the end of July, Israel killed three leaders of Iranian-backed terrorist groups in Beirut, Gaza and Tehran almost simultaneously. At first, the conflict parties feared an uncontrolled escalation. In fact, the Iranian regime is threatening retaliation. Israel will face harsh punishment for the attack on Hamas leader Ismail Haniya in the middle of the Iranian capital, presumably carried out with a mini-drone.

Nothing has happened so far – in contrast to the concentrated wave of attacks in April. At that time, Teheran had symbolically condemned an Israeli air strike against the Iranian consulate in Damascus. This time, only Hezbollah, the Shiite terrorist organization that controlled large parts of Lebanon, took action. But the retaliation for the killing of its founding member Fuad Shukr failed. Israel destroyed a large part of the positions before the missiles could be fired.

For now, the danger seems to be there. Obviously, neither the regime in Tehran nor the government in Tel Aviv are interested in an open war. In recent months, Iran has succeeded in forcing Israel onto the defensive via an “axis of resistance”. The Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon have become a serious threat – especially when the terrorist organizations act together and are coordinated by Tehran.

There is a peculiar form of stalemate between Israel and the “Axis of Resistance”, at least as far as the conventional means of warfare are concerned: in the event of an escalation, Israel would be existentially dependent on military support from the USA – as was the case when it fended off the wave of Iranian attacks in April – but at the same time the drones and missiles of the “Axis of Resistance” also seem to have lost their terror.

Neither party to the conflict can go all out

The Russian double strike against Hamas leader Haniya in Tehran and Hezbollah co-founder Shukr in Beirut could call into question Iran's entire regional strategy, says NZZ Middle East expert Ulrich von Schwerin. Neither the potential for guided missiles with which the “Axis of Resistance” can hit all of Israel, nor the combat power of Hezbollah's ground units are stopping the Israelis from launching attacks deep into the generic space.

In the past, the actors in the Middle East have shown little interest in a cooperative security order. The conflict is being fought according to the logic of pure power interests. Therefore, realistic approaches are better suited to a deeper understanding than liberal-idealistic concepts that are based on the ideas in Immanuel Kant's “Eternal Peace” or the principles of the UN Charter.

In his 1983 work “Conventional Deterrence,” John Mearsheimer explained the nature of conventional deterrence. His considerations provide a possible explanation for the current uncertainty about the future development of the conflict between Iran and Israel: “The fear of escalation, not the fear of defeat, is the decisive factor in deterrence,” writes Mearsheimer: “The possibility that conflict will spiral out of control and have catastrophic consequences often makes states cautious.”

For the current situation, this means that neither Iran nor Israel are in a position to control the escalation dynamics as they wish, let alone control them. That is why neither of the two conflicting parties is going all out.

The nuclear dimension as a central aspect

That is the rational side. In general perception, however, the Middle East conflict functions primarily according to irrational criteria, driven by religious belief, emotions and personal interests – such as the attempt by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to hold on to power for as long as possible. It is also possible that Iran is waiting until the opportunity for an operational surprise arises and then retaliates. The hostile attitude towards Israel is an instrument of power of the regime in Tehran.

Such considerations must be included in the assessment of scenarios, just as external factors do. The Middle East is also where the players in the major geopolitical conflict of the present are facing each other: the USA, Russia and China. Beijing has repeatedly put itself in the role of mediator. The Kremlin and the regime in Tehran are allies of convenience in Syria. The Russian army is relying on weapons from Iran for the war in Ukraine.

What the two main players in the Middle East have in common is that they have so far been able to evade the control of the major powers allied with them: the USA has only limited influence on the decisions of the Russian government, and the regime in Tehran does not take orders from Moscow. The crucial difference between the two conflicting parties remains that Israel has had its own nuclear bomb for fifty years, whereas Iran has not.

The following three scenarios of how the situation could develop must therefore also be considered from the perspective of nuclear deterrence:

Preventive strike: Last summer, the US and Israel reiterated their fears that Iran was close to having its own atomic bomb – some have said it would take six months. In fact, within the regime in Tehran, there is once again more open discussion of its own nuclear capabilities. From a recent perspective, the idea of Iran as a nuclear power capable of destroying Israel is unbearable. Netanyahu – or another prime minister – could therefore artificially bomb back nuclear and conventional capabilities with a preemptive strike. This option has been discussed for some time. Two factors could favor such a development: on the one hand, the concern that Israel will no longer be able to get out of the defensive, and on the other hand, the American elections. Who knows whether a nuclear agreement with Iran will suddenly be up for discussion again.
Balance of Terror: If the current situation continues and Iran does indeed have a nuclear bomb in six months, the conflict in the Middle East could develop in a similar way to the dispute between India and Pakistan. Both states have their own nuclear weapons and mutual territorial claims. However, the bomb has reduced the potential for escalation. In the Middle East, a continuation of the Israeli-Arab rapprochement process is conceivable. Saudi Arabia, which does not yet have an agreement with Israel, no longer seems to care much about the fate of the Palestinians and the two-state solution. The danger of such a development lies in the irrational components – such as the growing internal resistance to the Iranian regime. A kind of apocalypse with the collapse of the theocracy would be one of the most dangerous of all possibilities.
American demonstration of power: The USA – regardless of whether Donald Trump or Kamala Harris wins the election – can no longer place such a heavy emphasis of its resources on the Middle East in the long term. Competition with China could become a serious crisis this decade. One possibility is therefore a targeted operation by the USA against the “Axis of Resistance” to at least help Israel get out of the defensive. This would also intimidate Iran and, indirectly, Russia from expanding further. From a European perspective, it is easy to forget that Iranian Revolutionary Guards are also stationed in the Mediterranean: together with Hezbollah in Lebanon and, at the invitation of dictator Bashar al-Assad, also in Syria.

One of the bigger unknowns is Turkey, which is in competition with Iran in Syria and Iraq but often pursues similar goals. The incident with the two Marines in Izmir raises the question of how the middle power will behave if the American armed forces reduce their presence in Europe and the Middle East. Turkey has the second largest army in NATO after the USA.

The war in Ukraine, the uncertainty in the Middle East and the growing division of Western democracies are currently attracting the full attention of the West. What is missing is a fundamental idea of a more favourable development of the situation. With a communicable, positively connoted “grand strategy” it would be easier to find a consensus – and to counter power politics with something other than just aircraft carriers.